ANDREW J. PECK, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Pamela Williams, a forty-six year old African American woman, brings
Presently before the Court is Mt. Sinai's summary judgment motion. (Dkt. No. 22: Notice of Motion.) The parties have consented to decision of this case by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. No. 9.) For the reasons set forth below, Mt. Sinai's summary judgment motion is DENIED.
In August 1995, Williams began working as a phlebotomist in Mt. Sinai's Clinical Microscopy Unit. (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 1.) From May 1996 until her discharge in March 2011, Williams worked as a Patient Care Associate ("PCA") in Mt. Sinai's GP 8 East, Orthopedic Unit, Surgical and Medical Specialties and Emergency Services ("8 East"). (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 2.) PCAs assist registered nurses with patient care, including "assisting patient with activities of daily living, collecting specimens and performing procedures; maintaining a safe, clean environment." (Dkt. No. 23: McEvoy Aff. Ex. 1: Williams Dep. at 19-20 & Dep. Ex. 2: PCA Position Description.)
On October 19, 2009, Jennifer Jaromahum began working as 8 East's Clinical Nurse Manager and was responsible for the "day-to-day nursing operation" and the management of PCAs and nurses. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 28-29; McEvoy Aff. Ex. 2: Jaromahum Dep. at 19-20, 160-61.) Williams consistently received positive performance reviews in her position as PCA and did not receive formal discipline until 2010, after Jaromahum became her manager. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ P1, P33.)
Mt. Sinai uses a progressive discipline system. (Dkt. No. 43: Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P27; Dkt. No. 23: McEvoy Aff. Ex. 2: Jaromahum Dep. at 66-68, 110; Dkt. No. 38: Steiner Aff. Ex. 9: Johnson Dep. at 10-27.) Typically, a first warning is issued in the first instance where discipline is necessary, and when additional discipline is necessary, it becomes more severe. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P27; Jaromahum Dep. at 66-68; Johnson Dep. at 10-27.) The last three disciplinary steps generally are a final warning, a final warning with suspension and termination. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P27; Jaromahum Dep. at 66-68, 110.) In some instances, however, progressive discipline may not apply. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P28; Johnson Dep. at 16-20.)
Managers must contact a Senior Labor Relations Specialist ("Specialist") in the Labor Relations Department before discipline more severe than a documented counseling is issued. (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 23; Dkt. No. 26: Cohen Aff. ¶ 3.) While
On April 17, 2010, a discharged patient emailed Jaromahum complaining that Williams "was rude and very difficult to get help from." (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 35, P 17; Dkt. No. 23: McEvoy Aff. Ex. 2: Jaromahum Dep. at 46-50 & Dep. Ex. 1: 4/17/10 Patient-Jaromahum Email.) Jaromahum discussed the patient complaint with Williams and "encouraged her to be careful with her patient interactions." (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 36, P17; Jaromahum Dep. at 48-50.)
On May 13, 2010, another patient complained to Jaromahum that Williams had told the patient to "`hold it'" as the patient was about to vomit. (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 37, P13; Dkt. No. 23: McEvoy Aff. Ex. 1: Williams Dep. at 25-27 & Dep. Ex. 8: 5/13/10 Doc. Counseling; McEvoy Aff. Ex. 2: Jaromahum Dep. at 104-10.) Jaromahum gave Williams a documented counseling and stated that further incidents of unsatisfactory patient care would result in disciplinary action. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 38, P12-P13, P16; Williams Dep. at 25-27 & Dep. Ex. 8: 5/13/10 Doc. Counseling; Jaromahum Dep. at 104-10.) Jaromahum maintains that Williams denied any wrongdoing. (Mt. Sinai Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 38; Jaromahum Dep. at 108-09.) Williams asserts that she explained to Jaromahum that the patient was about to vomit in a basin containing the patient's urine; thus, she instructed the patient to "`hold it'" while she got a clean basin. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 37-38, P14; Williams Dep. at 25-27.)
On August 14, 2010, a Chinese patient's son complained to nurse Dominique Monsegur that his father had been transported roughly and a female African-American staff member lifted his father's hospital gown, laughed while pointing to his father's genitals and said "`Chinese people has small penis.'" (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 39, P19; Dkt. No. 23: McEvoy Aff. Ex. 2: Jaromahum Dep. at 111-13; Dkt. No. 38: Steiner Aff. Ex. 9: Johnson Dep. at 37-38, 53-55; Dkt. No. 25: Richards Aff. ¶ 5 & Ex. 1: 8/14/10 Coronel-Richards Email.) The complaint was brought to the attention of Clinical Nurse Manager Lorisa Richards, who was covering for the vacationing Jaromahum. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 41, P22.) On August 16, Richards met with the patient using a Mandarin interpreter; the "patient said that he did not want to make a big deal, but that he wanted the Hospital to know that he understood the comment that was made about his private part." (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 42-43; Richards Aff. ¶¶ 2, 6.) The parties dispute whether Williams was identified as making the comment. (See Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 39, 43.)
In addition, Surgical Care Associate Kialani Chambers stated that Williams said the patient was "eating too much fried rice." (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 44, 48, P24; Johnson Dep. at 55-56; Richards Aff. ¶ 7 & Ex. 3: 8/20/10 Chambers Stmt.)
Upon returning from vacation, Richards updated Jaromahum, and Jaromahum emailed Karen Johnson, a black Labor Relations
(Richards Aff. ¶ 9 & Ex. 7: 8/20/10 Williams Stmt.) Williams' statement, as well as statements from other staff, were sent to Johnson. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 48, 54, P22;
After reviewing Williams' prior documented counseling, Johnson wrote Jaromahum to "recommend issuing Ms. Williams a First Level Warning as a result of the recent incident" and to request a draft warning notice. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 58-59; Johnson Dep. at 39-41, 60-61 & Dep. Ex. 5: 9/2/10 Jaromahum-Johnson Emails.) Jaromahum sent Johnson a draft warning, and Johnson returned the revised warning to Jaromahum changing the level of discipline from a first to a final warning "because of the severity of the conduct." (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 60-63, P31, P34.) On September 2, 2010, Williams was given that final warning. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 64.)
On January 27, 2011, Jaromahum received an email complaint from a patient's daughter stating that her mother "was treated very badly by one of your PCA. I think her name is Pam.... She was very rude to my mom almost yelling at her to keep her table clean." (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 65, P35; Dkt. No. 23: McEvoy Aff. Ex. 2: Jaromahum Dep. at 76-82 & Dep. Ex. 4: 1/27/11 Patient-Jaromahum Email.) Jaromahum discussed the incident with Williams and encouraged her to be more sensitive, and when Jaromahum visited the patient later that evening, she reported that "Pam was `good' now." (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 66-67, P35.)
On January 28, however, the same patient complained to physical therapist Stephanie Suarez saying that Williams would not help her wash herself, was nasty and made her feel "`depressed,'" and requested that Williams no longer work with her. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 68-70, P35.) Suarez emailed Jaromahum regarding the patient complaint, and Jaromahum forwarded the email to Johnson. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 71-72.) In response to Johnson's request for Williams' performance history, Jaromahum responded, "She received a
Jaromahum asked Williams to provide a statement regarding the incident. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 73.) While Jaromahum maintains that Williams refused but later complied with the order to provide a statement (Mt. Sinai Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 73-74, 76), Williams asserts that she provided a statement the same day after sharing it with her union representative (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 73, 76, P37; Williams Dep. Ex. 13: 1/31/11 Williams Stmt.). Jaromahum discussed the matter with Williams and concluded that Williams did not refuse to wash the patient but that the patient misunderstood. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P36; Jaromahum Dep. at 95-100.) Jaromahum's conclusion, however, was not conveyed to Johnson or reflected in the draft warning notice. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 36; Jaromahum Dep. Ex. 4: 2/3/11 Warning Notice; Dkt. No. 38: Steiner Aff. Ex. 9: Johnson Dep. at 68-69.) Johnson decided to suspend Williams, and on February 3, 2011, Jaromahum suspended Williams for five days. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 77, P39.)
On March 17, 2011, a patient complained to Patient Representative Nina Kuscsik that she was concerned for her safety because when she asked Williams for help turning over, Williams replied, "`[d]o it yourself!'" (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 78, P40.) The patient also complained that Williams said that she was "`throwing away food that could be given to African babies'" and "`I saw you showing off yesterday,'" which the patient perceived as a negative comment. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 79, P40.) The patient's roommate complained to Kuscsik that when she asked Williams, "`[d]o you know when my catheter will be removed?'" Williams responded, "`[y]ou can ask.'" (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 80; Jaromahum Dep. Ex. 2: 3/17/11 Kuscsik-Jaromahum Email.)
Kuscsik summarized the complaints in an email to Jaromahum. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 81; Jaromahum Dep. Ex. 2: 3/17/11 Kuscsik-Jaromahum Email.) Jaromahum asked Williams to write a statement, and Jaromahum forwarded both Williams' and Kuscsik's statements to Johnson. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 83-84.)
On March 22, 2011, Johnson emailed Jaromahum stating that "`[t]he determination has been made to terminate Ms. Williams.'" (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 85.) Jaromahum drafted a termination notice at Johnson's request, and Johnson revised it. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 86-87.) On March 23, 2011, Jaromahum terminated Williams. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 88, P41.)
On June 1, 2011, Jaromahum received an email from a discharged patient complaining that Williams had called her personal cell phone several times "in violation of HIPAA regulations." (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 90-91.) Williams claims, however, that the patient had provided Williams with her phone number and that she did not access the patient's personal information to obtain it. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 91; Dkt. No. 23: McEvoy Aff. Ex. 1: Williams Dep. at 116-23.) Jaromahum forwarded the patient's email to Johnson. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 93.) Jeff Cohen,
While Jaromahum was Clinical Nurse Manager of 8 East, other employees were terminated or resigned in lieu of termination. (Dkt. Nos. 35 & 43: Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 98.) From November 2009 to July 2011, Nurse Richard Crookson (Black) resigned in lieu of termination for falsification of records, PCA Cheryl Powdar (Black) was terminated for sleeping while on a one-to-one observation of a patient, Nurse Veronica Okoye (Black) resigned in lieu of termination for over medicating a patient, Nurse Margaret Wolf (Caucasian) was terminated for unsatisfactory performance during her probationary period, Nurse Lisa Miller-Farmer (Black) resigned in lieu of termination for failure to report to her scheduled shifts and to follow the notification procedure, Nurse Etta Longly-Henry (Black) was terminated for substandard patient care, and Nurse Filomena Heredia (Filipino) was terminated for unsatisfactory performance during her probationary period. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 99-100, P59.) Specialists decided to terminate each of these employees, except the two on probation because managers can discharge employees during their probationary period. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 101, 103.)
Elaine Buchsbaum was a Caucasian nurse on 8 East also disciplined by Jaromahum in 2010 and 2011. (Dkt. No. 43: Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P42; Dkt. No. 38: Steiner Aff. Ex. 9: Johnson Dep. at 83-84.) In April 2010, Jaromahum received a written patient complaint stating that Buchsbaum twice failed to deliver pain medication causing the patient to ring the bell for fifteen and twenty-five minutes respectively, and Buchsbaum reprimanded the patient when she got out of bed to find Buchsbaum. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P43; Steiner Aff. Ex. 10: Jaromahum Dep. at 132-35 & Dep. Ex. 7: 4/2/10 Patient Compl.) Jaromahum discussed the incident with Buchsbaum and took no further action. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P44; Jaromahum Dep. at 135.)
On July 2, 2010, Jaromahum received another written patient complaint, that Buchsbaum failed to respond to repeated requests for pain medication and had poor bedside manner. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P46; Jaromahum Dep. at 136-37.) Jaromahum gave Buchsbaum a documented counseling. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P47; Jaromahum Dep. at 136-37.)
On August 13, 2010, Patient Representative Irene Selver emailed Jaromahum regarding a complaint from a patient's wife against Buchsbaum for failure to provide pain medication and for Buchsbaum's statement: "`I want your husband to be alive tomorrow,'" implying that the wife wanted her husband to be dead. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P48; Jaromahum Dep. at 137-41 & Dep. Ex. 7: 8/13/10 Jaromahum-Selver Email.) On August 27, 2010, the patient's wife followed up with a written complaint. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P50; Jaromahum Dep. Ex. 7: 8/27/10 Patient Compl.) Jaromahum gave Buchsbaum a second documented counseling but did not contact Labor Relations to initiate a discipline proceeding. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P51; Jaromahum Dep. at 139-41 & Ex. 7: 9/24/10 Doc. Counseling.)
In January 2011, Selver notified Jaromahum of another patient complaint about Buchsbaum. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt.
In February 2011, another patient complained that Buchsbaum was "`abrupt'" and that she felt uncomfortable and concerned about her ongoing care during Buchsbaum's shift. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P56; Jaromahum Dep. Ex. 7: 2/24/11 Selver-Jaromahum Email.) Jaromahum recommended that Buchsbaum receive a Second warning. (Williams Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ P57; Steiner Aff. Ex. 8: 3/1/11 Jaromahum-Johnson Email.) Buchsbaum received a Second Warning for poor patient care that would be reduced to a First warning if there were no further complaints for one year. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 106, P58.)
In February 2012, Johnson decided that Buchsbaum should be issued a Final Warning for poor patient care. (Mt. Sinai & Williams Rule 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 107.)
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lang v. Ret. Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir.1991).
The burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests on the party seeking summary judgment. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir.1994); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994). The movant may discharge this burden by demonstrating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case on an issue on which the non-movant has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53.
In evaluating the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court is not to resolve contested issues of fact, but rather is to determine whether there exists any disputed issue of material fact. See, e.g., Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1987); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987). To evaluate a fact's materiality, the substantive law determines which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. While "disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment[,] [f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 11-12.
When a case turns on the intent of one party, as employment discrimination... claims often do, a "trial court must be cautious about granting summary judgment." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994).
In other words, to defeat summary judgment, "the plaintiff's admissible evidence must show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant's employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination." Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d at 312; see, e.g., Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000); Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir.2000) (The question on summary judgment is "whether the evidence, taken as a whole, supports a sufficient rational inference of discrimination. To get to the jury, it is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must also believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination." (quotations & alterations omitted)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811, 124 S.Ct. 53, 157 L.Ed.2d 24 (2003); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir.1996) (plaintiff must "produce not simply `some' evidence, but `sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the employer were false, and that more likely than not [discrimination] was the real reason for the discharge'").
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
In connection with discrimination claims under Title VII, the Second Circuit applies the burden-shifting analysis established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff has the burden at the outset of "proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination." Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); see, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.
Once a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision. E.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. at 2106; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.
"Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under [the McDonnell Douglas] framework, `[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. at 2106.
If the defendant articulates a non-discriminatory reason, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework drops out of the picture, and the plaintiff must show that the adverse employment decision more likely than not was motivated in whole or part by discriminatory reasons. E.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. at 2106.
The Supreme Court in 2000 clarified the standard at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis:
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 146-49, 120 S.Ct. at 2108-09 (emphasis added & citations omitted).
After Reeves, the Second Circuit has made clear that merely proving a prima facie case and disproving the employer's explanation for its conduct at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis will not preclude summary judgment in all cases; rather, a case-by-case analysis is necessary:
Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d at 90 (emphasis added).
It is well settled that a plaintiff asserting a claim under Title VII must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. (See cases cited at pages 636-37 above.) A Title VII plaintiff meets that burden by showing that: (1) she was within a protected group, (2) she was qualified
Williams has met these minimal requirements. Williams is black, thus, a member of a protected class. (See pages 627-28 above.) Williams clearly was qualified for the PCA position at which she had worked since 1996, with no problems until 2010. (See page 628 above.) Williams suffered an adverse employment decision when she was terminated in March 2011. (See pages 631-32 above.) As to the fourth element, Williams does not point to any race-based comments by Mt. Sinai staff; rather, she attempts to show that she was terminated because of race discrimination by showing that Buchsbaum, a Caucasian employee with similar patient complaints, was not terminated. (See pages 632-33 above.)
Absent direct evidence of a defendant's discriminatory intent, a plaintiff may establish the fourth prong of the prima facie case, circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, by showing that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees outside her protected group. See, e.g., Broich v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 462 Fed.Appx. at 42-43; Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 493 (2d Cir.2010); Berube v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 348 Fed.Appx. 684, 686-87 (2d Cir.2009); Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir.2003); Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000); Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir.1997); Conway v. Microsoft, 414 F.Supp.2d 450, 459 (S.D.N.Y.2006). In order to prove that she was subjected to disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that she was "`similarly situated in all material respects' to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself." Conway v. Microsoft, 414 F.Supp.2d at 459.
"Whether two employees are similarly situated ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury." Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d at 39; accord, e.g., Broich v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 462 Fed.Appx. at 42-43; Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 790 (2d Cir.2007). Here, Williams has adduced enough evidence to support a finding that she and Buchsbaum were similarly situated in all material respects. Williams and Buchsbaum both worked in 8 East. (See pages 628, 632 above.) Both were disciplined by Jaromahum. (See pages 628-32, 632-33 above.) Both Williams and Buchsbaum had multiple patient complaints between April 2010 and March 2011. (See pages 628-32, 632-33 above.) The nature of the complaints were similar, including complaints that they were rude, made inappropriate comments and failed to fulfill patient requests. (See pages 628-32, 632-33 above.) Were a jury to find Williams and Buchsbaum similarly situated, it could conclude that the disparate treatment Williams received raises an inference of discrimination.
Accordingly, Williams has established a prima facie case of discrimination.
Mt. Sinai asserts that Williams "was discharged for rendering unsatisfactory patient care and not because of her race." (Dkt. No. 34: Mt. Sinai Br. at 18-21.) Williams admits that she was disciplined for five patient complaints but disputes some of the underlying conduct that resulted in the patient complaints. (See pages 628-32 above.) Nonetheless, Mt. Sinai has met its burden at the second McDonnell Douglas stage of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Williams' employment. See, e.g., Escribano v. Greater Hartford Acad. of Arts, 449 Fed.Appx. 39, 42 (2d Cir.2011) (Defendant "presented sufficient evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, supports the conclusion that [plaintiff]'s classes were cut for nondiscriminatory ... reasons — in this instance, due to budgetary
Accordingly, Mt. Sinai has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Williams' termination.
Williams asserts that Mt. Sinai's "reasons for terminating [her] are pretextual." (Dkt. No. 39: Williams Opp. Br. at 18-22.) "A showing that similarly situated employees belonging to a different racial group received more favorable treatment can also serve as evidence that the employer's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse job action was a pretext for racial discrimination." Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 43 (2d Cir.2000); see, e.g., Chao v. Mount Sinai Hosp., ___ Fed.Appx. ___, ___, No. 11-1328-CV, 2012 WL 1292757 at *3 (2d Cir.Apr. 17, 2012) (upholding grant of summary judgment because plaintiff "fail[ed] to identify any material difference between his treatment and that of similarly situated persons who do not fall within his protected classes."); Adamczyk v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 474 Fed.Appx. 23, 26, 2012 WL 1130637 at *3 (2d Cir.2012); Iuorno v. DuPont Pharm. Co., 129 Fed. Appx. 637, 640 (2d Cir.2005).
Williams has presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable inference that Mt. Sinai's rationale was a pretext for discrimination. Mt. Sinai argues that there was no discrimination because Johnson, not Jaromahum, decided the level of discipline. (See Dkt. No. 34: Mt. Sinai Br. at 21-22; Dkt. No. 44: Mt. Sinai Reply Br. at 9.) Jaromahum, however, had the discretion to and decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings with Labor Relations. (See pages 628-32, 632-33 above.) Mt. Sinai's disciplinary process is subjective in that the manager determines who and what conduct to report to Labor Relations for discipline. (See pages 628-29 above.) Taken in the light most favorable to Williams, the disciplinary decisions made by Jaromahum raise a material issue of fact concerning Williams' contention that Mt. Sinai's articulated reasons for termination were pretextual.
Mt. Sinai also asserts that Jaromahum gave other black employees favorable reviews and that Jaromahum terminated a Caucasian and Filipino employee. (See Mt. Sinai Br. at 25; Mt. Sinai Reply Br. at 6; see page 632 above.) "Since Title VII's principal focus is on protecting individuals, rather than a protected class as a whole, an employer may not escape liability for discriminating against a given employee on the basis of race simply because it can prove it treated other members of the employee's group favorably." Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d at 43.
Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, a rational juror could find that Mt. Sinai terminated Williams in part because she is black. See, e.g., Katz v. Adecco USA, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 539, 550 (S.D.N.Y.2012) ("[T]here are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether these proffered reasons were mere pretext meant to cover the true reason for [defendant]'s failure to hire Plaintiff...."); Williams v. Regus Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 836 F.Supp.2d 159, 179 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (Plaintiff "has provided sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable juror to conclude that his transfer was motivated in part by discrimination."); White v. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 814 F.Supp.2d 374, 391 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (denying summary judgment for employer "because a reasonable jury could find that the reasons offered for the adverse actions were pretextual"); Edrisse v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 757 F.Supp.2d 381, 390 (S.D.N.Y.2010) ("[D]efendants are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claims, as there is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that this proffered basis was a pretext for unlawful discrimination."); Abrams v. Duane Reade, 419 F.Supp.2d 476, 481-82 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether employer's stated reasons for not offering positions were a pretext for discrimination); Calabro v. Westchester BMW, Inc., 398 F.Supp.2d at 294 (denying summary judgment for employer where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the employer's stated reasons for termination were pretext for discrimination).
Accordingly, Mt. Sinai's motion for summary judgment on Williams' Title VII claim for race discrimination is DENIED.
For the reasons set forth above, Mt. Sinai's summary judgment motion (Dkt. No. 22) is DENIED.
The Joint Pretrial Order is due June 8, 2012. Counsel should confer and jointly call my chambers to schedule the commencement
SO ORDERED.
However, the NYCHRL is to be more liberally construed. E.g., Adams v. City of N.Y., 837 F.Supp.2d 108, 127-28 (E.D.N.Y.2011); Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 75, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 37-38 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 13 N.Y.3d 702, 885 N.Y.S.2d 716, 914 N.E.2d 365 (2009); see also, e.g., Hanna v. N.Y. Hotel Trades Council, 18 Misc.3d 436, 438 n. 1, 851 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 n. 1 (Sup.Ct. N.Y.Co.2007) ("NYCHRL is to be liberally and independently construed with the aim of making it more protective than its federal ... or state ... counterparts."). As I previously explained: "As this Court has pointed out several times, while the cases ... employ the same federal analysis to NYCHRL claims, the legislative history of the NYCHRL makes clear that it is to be even more liberally construed than the federal and state anti-discrimination laws." Viruet v. Citizen Advice Bureau, 01 Civ. 4594, 2002 WL 1880731 at *14 n. 28 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002) (Peck, M.J.) (quotations omitted; citing cases). Because the parties in this case have not argued for a different result under the NYCHRL than the NYSHRL or Title VII, and because Williams' claims survive summary judgment under Title VII (see below), the Court will not pursue the issue any further in this case.
